avoid the danger of assuming that whenever Hindus and Muslims or Sikhs and Muslims were in conflict, a significant number of people saw these events in 'communal' terms. Certainly, it is notjustifiable to class conflicts as religious or communal simply because the antagonists predominantly had different religious affiliations. In all the cases discussed below, however, there is adequate evidence that participants and observers both recognized that subjective matters of religious affiliation did in fact represent a significant, if not exclusive, issue in the conflicts.
Secondly, there is the question whether a distinction should be drawn between 'religious conflicts'-disputes over symbols, rites and precedents-and 'communal conflicts' in which broader aspects of a group's social, economic and political life were perceived as being unified and marked off from others by religious affiliation. Such a distinction must obviously be highly subjective, but the cases cited below do seem to contain examples of both types. There are cases of conflict limited to closely defined issues such as the priority of festivals or the location of mosques. But there are also cases where religious symbols appear to mark off, mobilize and sustain communities over much longer periods. Yet there is no clear development in time from closely defined 'religious' disputes to a broader perception of communities in conflict.
This leads on to a third issue: the question whether there existed or was coming to exist a broader Hindu or Muslim or Sikh 'consciousness' and if such consciousness did exist, the extent to which it provided an impetus to conflict between groups. There is certainly a growing body of sophisticated literature which demonstrates that some forces were tending in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to create areas of greater ideological and practical uniformity within the broad boundaries of religious affiliation. Thus among Muslims the spread of purist beliefs connected with teachers such as Shah Waliullah and Shah Abdul Aziz was such a force, influencing the learned and common people well beyond Delhi.7 Again the growing convergence between the mystical and scholarly branches of Islam gave elite teachers greater access to the masses." So, too, the expansion of the power of a locally rooted Muslim gentry after I65o and the decentralization of power from Delhi to provincial centres after 1700 spread pockets of purist Islamic practice both deeper and more widely across the face of Indian society. An autonomous desire for reputation, religion and respectability among 7 Rizvi, Shah 'Abd al-'Azizt; Metcalf, Islamic Revival. Muslim artisans ensured a popular interest in these new currents.9 Among Hindus, too, there were some developments which tended to greater uniformity within the great range of beliefs and practice. The expansion of heavily endowed Vaishnavite sects such as the Ramanandis'o influenced large areas of north Indian Hinduism while newly emergent Hindu states provided a good medium for the spread of a more ritualistic and Brahminical type of religion.
However, there are three points to be made when one tries to relate these changes to the incidence of tension between different communities.11 First, the impact of such changes in consciousness can easily be exaggerated. They were predominantly an urban and small-town phenomenon and left vast areas of customary religious practice untouched. Secondly, powerful and articulate religious movements which tended to suppress differences between the major religious traditions flourished contemporarily with the more purist ones (Bengal Vaishnavism or the followers of Kabir in north India, for instance). Thirdly, even if the unilinear growth of a more homogeneous Hindu or Muslim consciousness can be postulated (which seems doubtful), it is not the case that this necessarily gave rise to overt conflict or to the development of hostile communities. Thus, for instance, Delhi which was the major centre of Waliullah revival and resort of powerful and pious Hindu and Jain commercial groups, was relatively free of Hindu-Muslim tension throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 12 From the outset, then, it must be clear that this paper is not seeking to resurrect surreptitiously any simplistic 'two nation' theory. Yet the opposite is also true. If religious revitalization did not necessarily give rise to religious or communal conflict, it is also the case that the widespread Hindu-Muslim symbiosis of the pre-colonial and early colonial periods did not totally exclude the possibility of riot and disturbance along communal lines. When and how religious riots occurred in a predominantly syncretic culture is therefore the major concern of this paper. But in order to demonstrate that there is a question at issue, one must first dispense with the notion, fostered by 12 Narayani Gupta, Delhi between Two Empires (Delhi, I980). some colonial writers and by Maratha and Muslim communalists of the present century,'" that eighteenth-century Indian powers, particularly the Sikhs, Marathas and Mysore, were committed to exclusive strategies of religious revivalism. Only when the extent of interpenetration between the major religious traditions during the eighteenth century is appreciated does it become possible to ask questions concerning conflicts between their adherents.
Eighteenth-Century Religious Syncretism
The imperatives of regional and local state building during the eighteenth century and the flexible, all-India warrior society to which they gave rise both tended to confirm or newly to create relationships between the religious practices of the major faiths. as we have seen, his policies were directed to building up a core of support among Punjabi Muslims.
Much the most interesting illustration of this theme of sovereignty over religious places comes from an earlier period of Sikh history. In efforts to stamp out the religious and political threat of Sikhism Aurangzeb had carried out a relentless policy of repression against the sect. He had personally ordered the execution of the Sikh Guru Tej Bahadur, while his governor of the city of Multan had earlier killed the wife of Guru Govind Singh. These incidents assumed great symbolic significance in the ideology of the Sikhs and vengeance for them was a key aim in all subsequent relations with the Mughal throne and north Indian Muslims. When the Sikhs conquered Sirhind in I764 they made a deliberate policy of destroying every building, including its mosques. An early nineteenth-century observer noted that in the town of Sirhind 'To this day it is deemed a meritorious act in a Sikh to pull down from a standing wall three bricks and convey them to the Sutlej or Jumna'.3 To raze Delhi to the ground when it was conquered in I783 was, however, neither politic nor possible. The Sikhs, it is true, succeeded in destroying the Rikabganj mosque, near to the place where Guru Tej Bahadur was cremated, and replacing it with a Gurdwara. But both here and in the case of the Sisiganj mosque where the Guru had been executed there were elements of compromise with the local Muslim community. The Sikh leader Baghel Singh authorized attacks by his followers on the rural landholdings of leading members of the Delhi Muslim aristocracy to force them to agree to the demolition of the Rikabganj mosque. The use of force is perhaps less surprising than the fact that the Sikhs were seeking a formal acceptance of the act by the Muslim leadership and its legitimation by the powerless emperor. In the case of the Sisiganj mosque which was located near the kotwali and the heart of the Muslim city, the Sikhs and Hindus who supported them were fought to a symbolic draw. A gurdwara was built adjacent to the place of the Guru's execution which was located by an ancient Hindu water carrier who remembered the spot. But this did not involve the destruction of the mosque: instead the gurdwara was constructed inside the mosque compound.38 A similar delicate compromise was effected in the case of the state visit of the Sikh leader to the Mughal emperor.39 Hoping to capitalize on his remaining legitimacy, the emperor had called for an audience with Baghel Singh. But the Sikhs had customarily pledged themselves never to bow before the Mughal emperor or to accept his sovereignty. Nevertheless, an agreement was reached which satisfied both parties. The Sikh leader was to approach the imperial presence surrounded by his own troops, fanned with peacock feathers, the symbol of royalty. In deference to the Sikh religion Muslim butchers were to be moved out of the quarters through which he passed; introduced to the emperor he should say 'Sat Sri Akal' rather than the customary words of submission. On the other hand, Baghel Singh's cavalcade was to be headed by Mughal mace bearers, ceremonial gifts were to be offered and received, and a Mughal chamberlain was to do obeisance on behalf of the Sikhs, thus avoiding a personal obeisance by Baghel Singh. armed retainers. But as the great households had declined, the links had atrophied and small incidents could thus ensure that 'the tree of Hindu-Muslim aversion' grew deeper roots.59 One deeper social context, then, for these incidents of religious conflict was the rise and decline of warrior kingdoms and the culture they bore. As studies of European riots have shown, men of war and carriers of violence often stood at the heart of civil conflict. But it was at the point when warrior states were forming, and once again when they were in decline, that the potential for violence was greatest.
A similar consideration holds true when we consider the role of Hindu and Muslimjudicial and revenue officers in cases of communal violence. Both in the record of the late Mughal period and in the years of the Company Raj the 'chief registrars' (kazis) and 'chief executive officers' of the towns (kotwals) often took a leading role in religious violence. In itself this is hardly surprising. These officers were in an ambiguous position. Their existence-particularly that of the kazi-was itself a technical criterion that the land was Dar-ul-Islam. They were thus the formal guarantors of the supremacy of Islam in the locality. At the same time, however, they werejusticiars ofa Mughal Empire which in theory guaranteed its Hindu and Jain subjects some rights as protected subjects, and in practice gave them virtually equal rights out of equity. The tension between these two roles was intolerable so that when conflicts of a religious nature broke out the position of kazi and kotwal was always compromised on one count or another.
What is more interesting is the possibility that general changes in the personnel or the function of these offices could give rise to added instability in urban arenas, and thus provide the conditions for more sustained religious conflict. In the early eighteenth century, for instance, the position of the local officials was coming under a variety ofpressures. The conflict between factions at the imperial court and in the provinces representing the Indian-born Sheikhzadas and the older Irani or Turani nobility was leading to rapid changes in office-holders. Many offices were being leased out or even under-leased, and powerful Hindu landowners from the hinterland were whittling away the law officers' authority by setting up their own quarters and markets in many major towns. All these conditions impinged on the resolution of religious conflicts. So in the Ahmedabad riot, the kazi of the city, who was closely connected with a notably pro-Hindu governor and was accused of On the other hand, it cannot be argued that artisan culture in itself gave rise to a particularly strong 'communal identity'; indeed it could work in quite the opposite way, encouraging syncretic practices. So, for instance, Hindu and Muslim artisan castes participated together in veneration of the Sayyids of Pirana near Ahmedabad. In the early nineteenth century the Hindu followers of these sufi teachers were predominantly of the vegetable vendor castes, while the Muslims were silk and cotton weavers. So far had the shared religious culture proceeded that while the Hindus continued to cremate their dead, they carefully cut off the right forefinger of the corpse and buried it within the compound of the shrine.73 While the piety of many of these artisan communities cannot be in doubt, it seems quite incorrect to attribute to them any generalized 'fanaticism'. Tensions between artisan communi-. ties, or between them and merchants or hucksters, reflected quite specific and local economic grievances, though these might express themselves in 'communal' form on occasions.
Conclusions
The first purpose of this paper has been to draw attention to the incidence of communal conflict in India over the period I700 to I86o. This is important because many scholars are only dimly aware that widespread contention of this sort ever took place before the end of This paper has also challenged the widespread view that there was a necessary antithesis between forms of syncretic religious practice and communal violence: that is to say that while Hindus and Muslims lived face to face in villages or towns, conflict could not emerge. It is certainly true that the warrior culture of the eighteenth century encouraged many remarkable examples of syncretic practice. But this did not eliminate the possibility that clashes might occur over the status that different religious traditions held in relation to the control of festivals or holy places. The most savage rioting and destruction could take place between groups which in no way challenged the validity of syncretic practice.
Yet while this paper does not provide much support for the old nationalist view that pre-colonial and early colonial times (with the deplorable exception of Aurangzeb's reign) were characterized by entirely peaceful relations between the major religious groups, it cannot be taken to endorse the 'two nation' theory either. What seems difficult to show is that there was any unilinear or cumulative growth of communal identity before i86o. Indeed, one may very well doubt whether there was ever an identifiable 'Muslim', 'Hindu' or 'Sikh' identity which could be abstracted from the particular circumstances of individual events or specific societies. The notions of 'identity' or 'consciousness', so widespread in the literature now, whether applied to peasants or ethnic groups, seems most dubious on methodological and philosophical grounds, quite apart from the virtual impossibility of proving empirically that such entities ever existed. In some ways, the Annales term 'mentalit6' seems much more acceptable, implying as it does a more variable, ambiguous or fragmented form of consciousness and one that is partly contingent on social and economic circumstances
